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Jurisdiction, foundations 
I. Introduction 
1. Terminology and concepts 
Jurisdiction, literally (the power of) saying what the law is, is at the same time the most 
important and the most complex area of private international law. The complexities 
begin with terminology. Jurisdiction, in common law parlour, encompasses two 
meanings that are at least partly distinct in principle, even if they sometimes overlap in 
practice. These terminological and conceptual differences mar many comparative law 
analyses; they also make it difficult to develop a general theory. 
In one way, jurisdiction describes the outer limits of an institution’s reach. In this 
sense, the concept is not confined to adjudication but applies to the activities of all three 
branches of government and beyond. Besides jurisdiction to adjudicate there is also 
jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce, which limit, respectively, the spaces 
in which a country can legislate and enforce its own laws and decisions. The meaning of 
jurisdiction as the scope of a court’s power is encompassed within the term jurisdiction 
also in some other languages, thus in Italian (giurisdizione) and Austrian German 
(Jurisdiktion); in Germany, the term, insofar as courts are concerned, is Gerichtsbarkeit 
or Gerichtshoheit. 
In another sense, jurisdiction describes the allocation of adjudicatory competences 
vis-à-vis the (potentially) competing competence of other states’ courts. Insofar, 
Germany and Austria use the term internationale Zuständigkeit, the French speak of 
compétence internationale. In English, one could speak of international venue. 
Jurisdiction in this latter sense is frequently narrower than in the former sense. 
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The terminological differences show that, for purposes of theory and comparison, a 
functional definition is necessary. Functionally, for purposes of private international 
law, the law of jurisdiction can be defined as those rules and principles that determine 
the circumstances under which a court is entitled to adjudicate and render a substantive 
judgment with regard to the international and/or interstate connections involved.  
 
2. International jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction 
Where the jurisdiction of courts is at stake, we must distinguish what can be called 
international jurisdiction on the one hand from subject-matter jurisdiction on the other 
hand. What I call here international jurisdiction encompasses personal jurisdiction and 
jurisdiction in rem. Personal jurisdiction is jurisdiction over a person, most importantly 
over a defendant. Jurisdiction in rem was once understood to be jurisdiction over a thing 
based on its presence in the court’s territory. Today, in rem jurisdiction is also 
understood ultimately to be jurisdiction over a person; the presence of the thing merely 
provides the basis for the jurisdiction. 
Subject matter jurisdiction on the other hand is, in principle, not about international 
jurisdiction. Instead, it determines the subject matters about which a court is entitled to 
adjudicate. Nonetheless, subject matter jurisdiction can determine international limits of 
jurisdiction as well. This is the case, for example, when US federal courts derive their 
subject matter jurisdiction from the applicability of a federal statute (so-called federal 
question jurisdiction). In this case, courts have sometimes translated the territorial limits 
of the applicable federal statute into subject matter jurisdiction limits of the court. The 
US Supreme Court has recently suggested, however, that this should be treated as a 
question of substance (Morrison v National Australia Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 254 (2010)). 
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3. Direct and indirect jurisdiction 
The issue whether a court has adjudicatory jurisdiction can become relevant at two very 
different stages in an international litigation. The first stage concerns the proceedings 
before the court that renders the decision, hereinafter called the rendering court. The 
rendering court will not hear a case, much less render a decision, unless it determines 
that it has jurisdiction to do so. If it renders a decision despite the lack of jurisdiction, an 
appellate court may declare the decision void. The second stage concerns the 
proceedings before the court, often in a different state, requested to recognize and/or 
enforce the rendering court’s decision, hereinafter the requested court (Recognition and 
enforcement of judgments). The requested court will not recognize or enforce the 
decision of the rendering court unless it determines that the rendering court had 
jurisdiction. 
Although they are sometimes treated as though they were similar, the issue of 
jurisdiction as a requirement for adjudication is analytically different from the issue of 
jurisdiction as a requirement for recognition. The first is governed by the law of the 
rendering state, the second by the law of the requested court. Neither the rendering 
court, nor the recognizing court, is necessarily bound to the standards of the other. In 
French law, the first is called direct jurisdiction, the second indirect jurisdiction. This 
terminology is more exact than the German terminology (Entscheidungszuständigkeit 
and Anerkennungszuständigkeit) and certainly preferable to the English and American 
tendency to draw no terminological distinction at all. 
Direct and indirect jurisdiction are also different in policy terms. It may well be the 
case that the rendering court is justified to assert jurisdiction under its own standards, 
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and the recognizing court is similarly justified to deny recognition to the ensuing 
judgment for lack of jurisdiction under its own standards. 
  
II. Levels of regulation 
With the functional concept of jurisdiction developed earlier, it is possible to distinguish 
three levels of jurisdictional regulation. A first level, found primarily in higher law like 
international or constitutional law, lays down outer limits of jurisdiction. This higher 
law only constrains jurisdiction, it does not constitute a basis for jurisdiction. Such a 
basis can be found on a second level that provides the rules on which jurisdiction can 
actually be based. A third level, finally, concerns judicial discretion for the individual 
case, either in the application of the rules from the second level, or in special 
discretionary doctrines. Here, the question is whether jurisdiction that exists should be 
exercised. 
These levels facilitate a structural comparison between different jurisdictional 
regimes; they reveal that the levels do not play the same role in different legal systems, 
and they help to understand and classify different styles of jurisdiction regulation. 
Importantly, in particular, civil law systems rely almost entirely on the second level, 
while all but ignoring the first and third level. US law, by contrast, uses almost only the 
first and third level; actual rules of jurisdiction are largely based on findings from the 
first level. 
 
1. First level: higher law constraints 
 
a) Public international law 
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At the highest level of analysis lie higher law constraints that determine the outer 
boundaries of jurisdiction. Such constraints could in theory come from public 
international law in two ways. First, public international law limits the exercise of 
sovereign power vis-à-vis the sovereign interests of other states; to the extent that 
adjudicatory jurisdiction is viewed as an exercise of sovereign power, it could therefore 
be limited (eg German Federal Court of Justice (BGH), 2 July 1991, 115 BGHZ 90). 
Second, human rights law lays down certain rights that could be viewed as limiting the 
exercise of jurisdiction, in particular due process and fair trial rights (art 6(1) ECHR 
(European Convention of 4 November 1950 for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, 213 UNTS 221)). In reality, however, public international law 
has played a fairly limited role in limiting jurisdiction (Jurisdiction, limits under 
international law). Where it does, it can play a role both for direct and for indirect 
jurisdiction. 
Public international law can play a role in relation to jurisdiction also in the form of 
treaties in private international law, especially if such treaties are viewed merely as 
constraints and not as actual codifications of jurisdictional rules. Where such treaties 
exist, they are regularly coupled with rules on the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments; a harmonisation of rules on jurisdiction is viewed mainly as a prerequisite 
for obligations to enforce foreign judgments. While a number of bilateral treaties exist, 
multilateral treaties are rare. The most successful examples of such treaties (which are 
more codifications than constraints) are the Brussels Convention (Brussels Convention 
of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters [1986] OJ C 298/1, (consolidated version) [1998] OJ C 27/1) and 
the Brussels II Convention (Council Act of 28 May 1998 drawing up, on the basis of 
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Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, the Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters [1998] OJ C 
221/01) that were later turned into EU Regulations (Brussels I Regulation (Regulation 
(EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, [2001] OJ L 12/1) (Brussels 
I (Convention and Regulation), Brussels IIa Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 
2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental 
responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, [2003] OJ L 338/1)), and the 
Lugano Convention (Lugano Convention of 30 October 2007 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, [2007] OJ L 
339/3). By contrast, negotiations towards a comprehensive worldwide Hague 
Recognition and Enforcement Convention were so far unsuccessful; a new project is 
currently underway Among several problems, one was that Americans and Europeans 
viewed the character of such a Convention differently: while Americans thought of it as 
a mere constraint on possible rules of jurisdiction, Europeans thought of it as a 
comprehensive codification of rules on jurisdiction. This different attitude can explain 
why Europeans opposed, for such a long time, the inclusion of categories of jurisdiction 
as neither required nor forbidden (a so-called grey list). 
 
b) Constitutional law 
A practically more important higher law which limits jurisdiction is the Constitution. In 
US law in particular, the law of jurisdiction has been developed almost entirely on the 
basis of the Constitution, especially the due process clauses of the 5th and 14th 
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Constitutional Amendments (1 Stat. 97 (1789); 14 Stat. 358 (1866)). Courts, including 
the US Supreme Court, have distilled a whole array of specific rules and principles from 
these rather abstract clauses. The fact that so much of the law of jurisdiction has been 
constitutionalized has made the development of the law unpredictable. The Supreme 
Court of Canada has also begun to constitutionalize the Canadian law of jurisdiction, 
suggesting that principles of federalism require, for jurisdiction to be constitutional, a 
real and substantive connection (Club Resorts v Van Breda [2012] SCC 17). 
Some civil law constitutional norms also provide jurisdictional rules, such as in § 
59 of the old Swiss Federal Constitution of 1874 (AS 1 1, abolished in 1998, AS 1999 
2556, 2609). Mostly, however, the Constitution becomes relevant only occasionally, for 
example for jurisdictional rules that prioritize husbands over wives (Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany (BVerfG), 3 December 1985, 71 BVerfGE 224). 
 
2. Second level: specific rules 
Higher law, on the first level, lays down only the outer limits of jurisdiction, but does 
not lay down its bases. This is done instead on a second level of rules on jurisdiction. 
In civil law countries, this second level is by far the most important level. The 
European legislator has laid down mostly strict rules on jurisdiction in the so-called 
‘Brussels’ regime of a number of regulations on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments. Member States retain residual rules that apply outside the 
scope of the Brussels Regulations. In many civil law countries, jurisdiction is based 
entirely on domestic rules. For some time, countries that had no special rules for 
jurisdiction applied their rules on venue, either by analogy or as implicit rules on 
international jurisdiction (eg German Federal Court of Justice (BGH), 14 June 1965, 44 
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BGHZ 62; Cass Civ 1re, Scheffel, 30 Oct 1962; Recueil Dalloz 1963, 109) or developed 
principles on the basis of abstract considerations like fairness, efficiency, etc. (Japanese 
Supreme Court, 16 Oct 1981, Minshû 35-7-1224). Now, more and more countries have 
moved to codify their law on jurisdiction and thereby put it on firmer ground. 
Many common law countries also rest jurisdiction on detailed rules, at least beyond 
traditionally accepted bases of jurisdiction such as jurisdiction based on service of 
process within the territory. Due to the different nature and role of service of process, 
some of these rules are phrased as rules granting leave to serve outside the territory. 
Statutory rules exist also in the United States as so-called Long Arm Statutes, but their 
practical relevance pales in comparison to that of the constitutional constraints: many 
such rules largely codify existing case law on constitutional constraints, or even merely 
grant jurisdiction up to the limits of the US Constitution. 
 
3. Third level: discretion on a case-by-case level 
Even where jurisdiction is not constrained by higher law and is based on a specific rule 
that authorizes it, the judge may nonetheless, because of characteristics of the individual 
case, decline to exercise it. Such judicial discretion is more common in the common 
law, but it exists also in civil law systems. 
 
a) Common law, especially forum non conveniens 
Whether or not jurisdiction exists, is, in common law systems, frequently a matter of 
case-by-case analysis of the individual case, which helps administer justice in the 
individual case but reduces predictability and certainty. Some such elements are built 
into jurisdictional tests. Thus, in US law, the court has to determine, as part of the 
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jurisdictional test, whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. In US and English 
law, the court may decline jurisdiction to ensure the application of mandatory forum 
laws.  
The most important discretionary basis for declining jurisdiction is the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens. First developed in Scottish law, this doctrine has now been 
adopted in many common law systems. Under this doctrine, a judge will decline to 
exercise jurisdiction when the forum is inappropriate, and an available alternative forum 
in another legal system is clearly better suited than the forum. Doctrinally, forum non 
conveniens is not a jurisdictional provision, because its application leaves the existence 
of jurisdiction in the case intact and goes merely to the exercise of such jurisdiction. 
Functionally, however, existence and exercise of jurisdiction are closely related. This 
proximity is the reason why the ECJ refused the applicability of the doctrine in the 
realm of the Brussels I Regulation (Case C-281/02 Owusu v NB Jackson and others 
[2005] ECR I-1445), and the French Cour de Cassation has argued similarly for the 
Montreal Convention (Convention of 28 May 1999 for the unification of certain rules 
relating to international carriage by air, 2242 UNTS; Cass Civ 1re, 7 December 2011, 
Recueil Dalloz 2012, 254).  
 
b) Discretion in civil law systems 
In contrast to the common law, which traditionally leaves a high degree of discretion to 
courts in matters of jurisdiction, the traditional civilian approach rejects such discretion 
and requires strict application of formal rules. Forum non conveniens is, as a 
consequence, rejected. However, discretion in the application of individual bases is 
sometimes accepted. This holds true in view of parallel litigation (arts 33 and 34 
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Brussels I Regulation (recast) ( Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast), [2012] OJ L 
351/1)), but also in the application of open-ended terms, such as ‘closely connected’ in 
arts 8(1) and 30(3) Brussels I Regulation (recast). 
 
III. Interests, theories, and paradigms 
Scholars from different legal traditions have paid very different degrees of attention to 
the development of theories for the law of jurisdiction. German scholarship has focused 
not so much on theories as on uncovering the policy interests underlying the law of 
jurisdiction. While US scholars have long worked on theories, in part fuelled by the 
need to rationalize a seemingly erratic Supreme Court case law, other common law 
jurisdictions have largely preferred pragmatism over the development of general 
theories. In other civil law countries, theories have been developed but have played a 
lesser role.  
 
1. Interests 
Following Gerhard Kegel’s (Kegel, Gerhard) focus on interests in choice of law, 
German scholars developed a list of such interests for the law of jurisdiction. Common 
law doctrine does something comparable when developing relevant factors for forum 
non conveniens dismissal. The individual interests and factors carry different weight in 
different legal regimes. 
 
a) Party interests/private factors 
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A first set of interests underlying the law of jurisdiction are party interests. To some 
extent, these interests are antagonistic: everything else being equal, defendants and 
plaintiffs are typically each interested in litigating at home. Plaintiffs have an interest in 
access to court; defendants have an interest in not being required to defend themselves 
far from home. Civil law validates especially the defendant’s position: plaintiffs can 
only exceptionally sue at a place other than the defendant’s home (‘actor sequitur forum 
rei’); at the same time, the defendant cannot unilaterally avoid the jurisdiction of its 
home court. The common law allows such avoidance through the forum non conveniens 
doctrine; on the other hand, especially US law often starts from the assumption that 
plaintiffs have a legitimate interest in suing at their own home and asks to what extent 
this can be allowed. 
Plaintiffs have an interest in litigating at a place where the defendant has assets, 
because this facilitates enforcement. This interest can be used to justify not only in rem 
jurisdiction, but especially quasi in rem jurisdiction. It does not, by itself, justify the 
assertion of unlimited jurisdiction at a place where the defendant has some assets but 
not enough to fulfil the plaintiff’s claim, such as in § 23 German Code of Civil 
Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung of 5 December 2005, BGBl. I 3202, as amended, 
henceforth German CCP) or § 99 Austrian Court Jurisdiction Act (Jurisdiktionsnorm of 
1 August 1895, Reichsgesetzblatt no 111/1895, last amended by Bundesgesetzblatt no I 
78/2014, henceforth Austrian JN). These provisions are therefore considered exorbitant. 
Certain types of parties are deemed worthy of particular protection: this is the case, 
at least in civil law systems, for employees and consumers, for whom it would be more 
burdensome to litigate away from their home than for a corporate party. As a 
consequence, some laws of jurisdiction protect these parties by allowing them to sue 
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and be sued exclusively at their home place or, in the case of employees, in the place 
where they habitually carry out their work (eg arts 18, 21 Brussels I Regulation 
(recast)).  
Parties also have common interests in the predictability of the venue for litigation. 
The law acknowledges this interest by enforcing choice of court agreements, with 
regard to both prorogation and derogation. Exceptions exist for the protection of either 
specific types of parties (like, again, consumers and employees, arts 19, 23 Brussels I 
Regulation (recast)) or exclusive bases of jurisdiction. 
In addition, parties have an interest in availability of witnesses and other evidence 
and records. This can suggest establishing jurisdiction at a place in proximity to the 
subject matter of the litigation, for example the place of the injury for tort litigation (eg 
art 7(3) Brussels I Regulation (recast)).  
 
b) Court interests/public factors 
Another set of interests is held by the court, both as an institution and as a representative 
of its state. A first interest is in maintaining a manageable court load. This interest 
mandates against jurisdiction over cases that have only scant connections to the court. 
On the other hand, courts may have an interest in attracting litigation that brings money 
to the local bar and enhances the court’s reputation and standing; such interests are 
pursued particularly in courts trying to attract commercial litigation, for example New 
York, London, and Singapore. 
Another interest that is specific to the court is ease of application of law. Everything 
else being equal, it is easier for a court to adjudicate if it can apply its own law than if 
foreign law is applicable (lex fori). Some have suggested this interest to be so 
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overwhelming that applicable law and jurisdiction should always coincide (‘lex fori in 
foro proprio’). In some situations, such coincidence does occur because the connecting 
factors for jurisdiction and for choice of law are the same. Applicability of foreign law 
is a powerful factor in favour of forum non conveniens dismissal. By contrast, 
applicability of domestic law can be the basis for jurisdiction, as is the case for federal 
question jurisdiction in the US (supra).  
Finally, a state’s regulatory interests can serve as a basis for jurisdiction. A state 
that wants to make sure that certain of its mandatory rules are applied will frequently 
ensure this by giving its own courts jurisdiction, and by providing that parties cannot 
opt out of this jurisdiction through a choice of court agreement. As a legislative 
mechanism this has become common. It is more doubtful, especially under the Brussels 
I Regulation, whether courts are entitled to disregard a choice of court agreement in 
order to protect mandatory rules without an explicit jurisdictional basis. 
 
c) Structural interests/interests of the international system 
A third set of interests concerns the international system – whether a real system (as in 
the European Union with its widely unified law of jurisdiction) or an imagined one (as 
on a global level). There is, arguably, a global interest in jurisdictional certainty and 
harmony, suggesting that litigation should be channelled to the most appropriate forum 
(the forum conveniens). Within the European Union, this is guaranteed, to some degree, 
through unified jurisdictional rules on a European level, which reduce opportunities for 
forum shopping, without eliminating them altogether. On a global level, a similar 
harmonisation could be brought about through a treaty, but ambitious attempts to draft a 
Ralf Michaels Forthcoming in Elgar Encyclopedia of Private International Law  
worldwide Hague Recognition and Enforcement Convention have so far been 
unsuccessful. 
A global interest in harmony is further evident through rules on lis alibi pendens: a 
court will, under this approach, deny jurisdiction in view of litigation that is pending 
elsewhere, or in view of a (recognizable) judgment from the courts of another state. 
Civil law systems used to have rather strict rules in this regard, which enabled strategic 
forum shopping. Common law systems take a more flexible approach and allow courts 
to decline to exercise their own jurisdiction in view of the foreign proceedings (forum 
non conveniens), and sometimes attempt to discourage a party from proceeding with 
litigation started elsewhere by granting antisuit injunctions. Although antisuit 
injunctions are directed against a party and not a foreign court, they are part of the law 
of jurisdiction in a functional sense. 
 
2. Theories 
Different theories of jurisdiction have been developed. Here, a focus lies on theories 
developed especially in the US context. 
a) Power theories 
The power theory is famously encapsulated in Justice Holmes’ assertion that ‘[t]he 
foundation of jurisdiction is physical power.’ The basis of the theory is the relationship 
of domination and submission between the court and the defendant. In ancient England, 
this meant actual power. Jurisdiction was asserted over the defendant by physical arrest, 
to ensure his presence at the trial. Since then, the assertion of power has changed from 
actual to symbolic; the public and actual assertion of power is now privatized and 
symbolized in service of process by the plaintiff or its attorneys, at least in common law 
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systems. When service of process is considered sufficient for the existence of 
jurisdiction, unconstrained by fairness considerations or the need of other connections 
(eg Maharanee of Baroda v Wildenstein, (1972) 2 QB 283 (CA); Burnham v Superior 
Court of California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990)), this is best justified on the basis of a power 
theory. 
 
b) Relational theories 
Closely related are relational theories of jurisdiction. A relational theory gives 
jurisdiction to a sovereign’s courts if and because the defendant owes the sovereign 
allegiance. The clearest example can be found in feudal relations, where the lord’s 
jurisdiction over his fee-holders was based on the feudal relation between the two. 
Although feudalism no longer exists, there are remnants of such theories: for example, 
arts 14 and 15 French Civil Code (Code Civil of 21 March 1804; henceforth French 
CC), which base jurisdiction by French courts on the parties’ French nationality, can be 
explained by reference to relational theory. 
 
c) Fairness theories 
Today. the main focus of a fairness theory is not the power of the court over the 
defendant, but rather whether it would be inconvenient for the defendant to defend itself 
in a forum it did not choose. The US Supreme Court formulated a two-prong test in 
International Shoe v Washington (326 U.S. 310 (1945)), relying on minimum contacts 
and substantial fairness to the defendant; a third requirement of reasonableness was 
added later (Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 
(1987). Fairness theories focus on the relationship between the litigants and the forum, 
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as well as that between the underlying controversy and the forum, but unlike relational 
theories, the question is one of fairness regardless of sovereignty considerations. 
Although much has been made of the difference between power and fairness 
theories, the difference is smaller than is sometimes assumed. Both theories see power 
as necessary for jurisdiction. They differ merely on whether power is also sufficient, or 
whether additional factors of fairness and reasonableness must be present. 
 
3. Paradigms 
A different way of arranging for different approaches to jurisdiction is to order them by 
paradigms. With some simplification, two paradigms can be contrasted. Continental 
European law stands for the first, US law stands for the second. Traditional English law 
stands, in many regards, somewhere between both paradigms, which helps explain some 
of its clashes with the European system. 
 
a) ‘Us or Them’ – the European paradigm 
The European paradigm can be called ‘us or them’. First, this paradigm is horizontal: 
European jurisdictional thinking focuses on the horizontal relations between countries 
rather than on the vertical relation between the court and the parties. The real question 
of jurisdiction in Europe is neither whether there are sufficient vertical contacts between 
the defendant and the country whose courts are seized, nor whether such contacts exist 
between that country and the controversy. The real question is which of several states’ 
courts are the most appropriate to deal with a type of litigation. Jurisdiction is justified 
vis-à-vis other states with a plausible claim to jurisdiction, not vis-à-vis the defendant 
and its interest in protection from the court. 
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Secondly, as a consequence, jurisdictional thinking in the European tradition is 
multilateral and international. This is so not just for the Brussels Regulations: even in 
national laws, jurisdiction is allocated according to principles that are at least potentially 
universal. The main criteria for jurisdiction are consent and the closest connection.  
Thirdly, the paradigm is apolitical: matters of private litigation are considered 
apolitical; the state’s only task is to provide a forum. Matters of private litigation are 
considered apolitical; the state’s only task is to provide a forum. The reason is that 
although the focus of jurisdiction is international, its goal is the correct adjudication of 
relations between the parties, where state interests are thought to be largely absent. 
 
b) ‘In or Out’ – the US paradigm 
By contrast, the US jurisdictional paradigm can be called ‘in or out’. First, this 
paradigm is vertical: regardless of whether jurisdiction is based on the power of the 
court over the defendant, the relations between the court and the defendant, or the 
fairness of asserting jurisdiction over the defendant, nearly all attention goes to the 
vertical relation between the court and the defendant. 
Second, the paradigm is unilateral and domestic. This means that jurisdiction is 
viewed as a local issue, determined by the limits that national (or state) law sets for its 
own courts, not the appropriateness of the jurisdiction of other states’ courts. The 
question is whether the dispute brought to the court lies within, or outside, the state’s 
boundaries, inside or outside the state’s legal order. Unlike in an international paradigm, 
in a domestic paradigm it is largely irrelevant whether the courts of other states would 
more appropriately exercise jurisdiction. Matters of jurisdiction are domestic matters; 
foreign national interests are relevant only insofar as they can be translated into such 
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domestic matters. (Note that this is true only for the law of jurisdiction proper. The 
appropriateness of jurisdiction elsewhere is considered in the forum non conveniens test, 
to some extent also in the reasonableness requirement.) 
Thirdly, the paradigm is political. Since the exercise of jurisdiction is viewed along 
a vertical dimension as a public intrusion into the defendant’s freedom, the individual 
has a negative right to be free from state intervention unless this intervention is justified. 
This is why justification for jurisdiction often occurs with reference to political 
philosophers dealing with the justification for governmental authority, be they Hobbes 
and Locke or Rawls, Hart, and Nozick. 
 
IV. Bases 
Although jurisdictional rules display a plethora of criteria, these criteria can be grouped 
into three different categories of bases: consent, proximity, and extraordinary bases. 
 
1. Consent 
A first basis of jurisdiction is consent (Choice of forum and submission to jurisdiction). 
Such consent is least problematical when the defendant submits to the jurisdiction 
during litigation. A defendant can consent to the jurisdiction either explicitly or 
implicitly, by pleading on the merits. Mere pleading on jurisdiction is not usually 
viewed as submission to the jurisdiction on the merits. 
Prior consent, through a choice-of-court agreement, is in principle no different. A 
defendant who consents to the jurisdiction of a court cannot complain that the exercise 
of that jurisdiction violates its rights and interests, whether vis-à-vis the court or vis-à-
vis the plaintiff. For some time, consent jurisdiction was suspicious because it seemed to 
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oust another court of its jurisdiction; today, jurisdiction based on consent is widely 
accepted. Limitations emerge from general contract law, from the desire to protect 
weaker parties (like consumers and employees), and from the need to maintain 
exclusive jurisdiction for certain areas (for example litigation over land). 
 
2. Proximity 
The large majority of bases of jurisdiction are based on proximity, some connection that 
exists between the court and either the transaction or the parties. Both civil and common 
law distinguish between general and specific jurisdiction (though with slight variations 
in definition). General jurisdiction is party-related and is comprehensive – it exists, 
untechnically spoken, at the defendant’s home. Specific jurisdiction, by contrast is 
based on a connecting factor and limited to issues related to this factor, for example 
jurisdiction in tort at the place of the tort, etc. 
Existing bases of jurisdiction can be grouped, parallel to the three traditional 
elements of the state, as those pertaining to territory, citizenship (personality) and 
government (state interests). 
 
a) Territoriality 
Territoriality is an important – for many, the dominant – basis of jurisdiction. The most 
important territorial connection in the law of jurisdiction is a party’s domicile (eg arts 4, 
5 Brussels I Regulation (recast)) or its habitual residence (eg arts 3, 8 Brussels IIa 
Regulation). In the common law, mere presence in the jurisdiction is sufficient as a 
ground for jurisdiction. For natural persons, this is physical presence; for corporations, 
it was long, in the United States, ‘doing business’ in the jurisdiction, until the Supreme 
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Court significantly curtailed this basis (Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA v 
Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846; Daimler AG v Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746 (2014)). Many bases of 
specific jurisdiction are also based on a certain place – the place of conduct or of injury 
for torts, the place of entering into a contract or of performance for contracts, and so on. 
Territorial factors can be justified under power considerations, because the state 
has power over its territory and everything that goes on in it. Similarly, they can be 
justified under fairness considerations: an individual who avails himself of the benefits 
of a state can be required to submit to its jurisdiction. Problems of fairness arise where 
someone enters a territory involuntarily, or where effects on a territory were 
unforeseeable, as can be the case for product liability when a product creates an injury 
outside the market in which it was first sold (Asahi Metal Ind Co v Sup Ct, 480 U.S. 102 
(1987), different insofar the plurality in McIntyre Machinery Ltd v Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. 
2780 (2011)), and for internet defamation occurring at a faraway place (see German 
Federal Court of Justice (BGH), 2 March 2010, 184 BGHZ 313). 
Under conditions of globalization, territoriality changes its meaning. Some authors 
think that territoriality should lose its importance for the law of jurisdiction. Others 
argue the opposite: precisely because borders become more permeable, the law has to 
use territorial borders to delineate jurisdictional competences (thus eg the US Supreme 
Court in F Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (2004)). Even if the 
latter view prevails, territoriality still shifts its meaning: it is concerned less with 
considerations of power and fairness, and more with the need for formal and easily 
administrable criteria of jurisdictional allocation. 
 
b) Personality 
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Not all jurisdictional criteria are territorial. Some systems are explicitly based on criteria 
of citizenship, thus for example French law in arts 14 and 15 French CC. These 
provisions are considered exorbitant. But for many other regimes of jurisdiction and 
forum non conveniens, the parties’ nationality plays a role. This is so especially in 
family law; the Brussels IIa Regulation provides for divorce jurisdiction on the basis of 
either habitual residence or nationality (art 3(1)). Jurisdiction based on nationality can 
be justified by a state’s interest in regulation and protection of its own citizens. In 
common law countries, domicile plays a somewhat similar role of affiliation. 
Altogether, the existence of such bases of jurisdiction demonstrates that territoriality is 
not exclusive. 
 
c) State interests 
Finally, the third element of the state, namely a functional government, translates into 
governmental or state interests as the basis of jurisdiction. This can have a positive and 
a negative aspect. Positively, as was discussed earlier, a state may base its jurisdiction 
on the desire to make sure that particularly important regulatory interests are enforced. 
But state interests can also have a negative impact: another state’s strong regulatory 
interests may be a reason for a court to decline exercising its jurisdiction. In reality, it 
appears that courts are more willing to assert jurisdiction on the basis of their own 
state’s regulatory interests than to decline its exercise in view of such regulatory 
interests elsewhere. Indeed, such foreign regulatory interests can frequently be 
accommodated through application of the foreign state’s laws. 
 
3. Extraordinary bases 
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a) Exorbitant jurisdiction  
Several bases of jurisdiction in domestic systems are viewed as exorbitant and therefore 
considered unjustified. Other states do not accept the exercise of jurisdiction on these 
bases as justified for purposes of enforcement; scholars hope for their abolition also for 
domestic purposes. The Brussels I Regulation abolishes these exorbitant bases in 
Member States’ systems with regard to defendants from within the EU, but does not 
interfere with them with regard to defendants outside the EU (see arts 5(2), 6(2) 
Brussels I Regulation). 
Among the bases of jurisdiction considered exorbitant are: jurisdiction based on the 
plaintiff’s nationality (art 14 French CC), unlimited jurisdiction based on the presence 
of assets belonging to the defendant (§ 23 German CCP, § 99 Austrian JN); general 
jurisdiction based on a corporation’s doing business. Jurisdiction based on service of 
process is sometimes considered exorbitant by civilians, although it is the main 
traditional basis of jurisdiction in the common law. This demonstrates the extent to 
which what is considered exorbitant is often a matter of perspective. 
 
b) Jurisdiction of necessity 
Such exorbitant bases appear less shocking once one recognizes their broader function. 
Especially at a time when travelling to a foreign court would have been cumbersome, 
and the recognisability and enforceability of foreign judgments was uncertain, these 
bases provided a local basis of jurisdiction which, although based on a rather tangential 
connection, was vital in order to provide plaintiffs with access to court. 
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Viewed as such, exorbitant jurisdiction is closely related to so-called jurisdiction of 
necessity. Under this doctrine, a court may, exceptionally, assume jurisdiction even 
absent the normal connecting factors if this is necessary to provide the plaintiff with 
access to court (eg art 3 Swiss Private International Law Act (Bundesgesetz über das 
Internationale Privatrecht of 18 December of 18 December 1987, 1988 BBl I 5, as 
amended); § 28(1) Austrian JN; art 3136 Code civil (Quebec) (SQ 1991, c 64.). Such 
necessity is thought to exist especially if no other competent court is available, either 
because other courts do not have or will not exercise jurisdiction, or because these other 
courts are incapable for other reasons of providing justice. Jurisdiction of necessity has 
always been contested, as to both its existence and its limits. Nowadays, it has arguably 
become less important: existing jurisdictional bases provide plaintiffs with a broader set 
of options, litigating abroad has become easier (though not always easy), and increased 
mutual recognition of judgments makes foreign judgments more valuable. Nonetheless, 
the doctrine still plays a practical role. 
 
c) Universal jurisdiction 
Universal jurisdiction is arguably a specific type of such jurisdiction of necessity. Under 
this doctrine, every court in the world has jurisdiction at least potentially, even without 
the need of either the parties’ consent or proximity. It is granted (if at all) for claims of 
violation of certain rules of international law. Originally developed in international 
criminal law, the doctrine has been expanded into the area of private international law. 
In the United States, such civil universal jurisdiction could be claimed, for some time, 
under the US Alien Tort Statute (28 U.S.C. § 1350). In recent years, the US Supreme 
Court has severely restricted applicability of the statute for private litigation (Sosa v 
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Alvarez-Machain 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S.Ct. 
1659 (2013)). Whether such civil universal jurisdiction exists in other legal systems is 
doubtful. In many cases, existing bases of jurisdiction suffice to achieve the goals of 
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